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INTRODUCTION 
My argument is that the presidency of the United States has the 
institutional disposition and capacity for constitutional arrogance—to take 
unilateral actions challenging its constitutional boundaries and extending its 
powers at other authorities’ expense. While every federal branch is prone to 
push its respective powers to—if not beyond—its limits (which is why the 
Constitution requires “[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambition”1), 
there are several, unique forces incentivizing the presidency, as an institution, 
to have the disposition and the ability to aggrandize its authority.2  
Part I of this Article will define the concept of constitutional arrogance, 
its possible benchmarks, and the forces pushing Presidents toward it. While 
the presidency was originally constructed to defend against legislative 
tyranny,3 its power has grown offensively. Through historical practices4 and 
hierarchical design, the presidency has developed the disposition and capacity 
to take advantage of constitutional indeterminacy and wrest power from other 
branches. When Presidents are threatening or achieve such expansions 
through unilateral actions, they are manifesting constitutional arrogance.  
In Part II, I shift focus from the forces generally shaping presidential 
performance to specific illustrations of constitutional arrogance. I focus on 
three case studies—recess appointments, removal, and immigration—that 
demonstrate different ways in which Presidents have taken unilateral actions to 
expand their control over policymaking. 
My perspective is grounded in institutionalism, which seeks to illuminate 
the context of presidential actions, to situate such actions within the arc of 
developing presidential authority over time, and to provide a basic language for 
understanding presidential power.5 From this perspective, I suggest, in Part III, 
that the most potent constraints on constitutional arrogance are judicial review, 
public opinion, concerns about historical legacy, and conventions. Although law 
provides a conceptual framework and grammar, these considerations provide 
some resistance to, but do not always curb, the presidency’s propensity and 
capacity to take advantage of constitutional indeterminacy and undertake 
 
1 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 319 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). 
2 In keeping with this Symposium’s focus, I do not make any comparative institutional judgments 
in this Article and only examine the presidency’s disposition and capacity for constitutional arrogance.  
3 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 1, at 319-20 (James Madison) (noting that in 
republican governments legislative authority “necessarily predominates” and the Executive is one 
check on that power). 
4 See infra notes 16-22 and accompanying text. 
5 For the classic work on institutionalism, see STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS 
MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO GEORGE BUSH 30 (1993) [hereinafter SKOWRONEK, 
THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE], which builds a model for measuring presidential power that 
situates Presidents in “political time,” which he defines as the cycle through which the presidency, 
at different times, moves from one kind of leadership mode to another.  
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unilateral action with the purpose or effect of aggrandizing itself and wresting 
power from other branches, particularly Congress.  
I. THE LANGUAGE AND METRICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ARROGANCE 
In this Part, I explain the basic terms and metrics this Article will use. 
Arrogance is the most unique term that I use, but the others should seem familiar.  
A. Why Arrogance 
My focus is on the presidency as an institution. It has a discernible design and 
particular powers and prerogatives: its occupants share distinctive goals, their 
incentives are similarly structured, and their approaches to governing and 
institution building are similar. One such approach is the presidency’s propensity 
and capacity for constitutional arrogance. Constitutional arrogance entails 
Presidents using their unilateral powers to break boundaries and displace other 
constitutional authorities. This definition is primarily functional,6 depending not 
on motive or intentions but on the presence of unilateral presidential actions 
challenging, breaking, and extending constitutional boundaries on presidential 
authority. The actions are offensive,7 undertaken in different manners,8 all 
attempting to take charge or arrogate control over constructing or reconstructing 
constitutional meaning,9 at the expense of other authorities.  
 
6 For the dictionary definition of “arrogance,” see Arrogance, THE FREE DICTIONARY, 
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/arrogance [https://perma.cc/SX2N-L84X], which defines arrogance as 
“the state or quality of being arrogant,” an “offensive display of superiority” or “overbearing pride.”  
7 The actions are not offensive in the sense of being the opposite of defensive. They need not initiate 
action or conflict. They must be aggressive exertions of power that exploit constitutional indeterminacy and 
provoke negative reactions from other authorities. They can sometimes be important steps toward the 
construction of presidential power. See infra note 9 and accompanying text.  
8 Some people may find the word “arrogance” offensive or overly inclusive. Its meaning may be clearer 
if the term, which may be used to characterize the posture of any governmental official, including judges, is 
contrasted with its opposite—constitutional humility, which I have described in the context of judging as 
being aware of the limitations of one’s own knowledge, insights, and power; moderating one’s tone; and being 
respectful and deferential to the constitutional judgments of other branches. See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, 
Constitutional Humility, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 23 (2007). It may also be useful to consider as possible limiting 
principles the manner, style, or stance with which Presidents take action, and the pushback by other 
constitutional actors, such as Congress. Indeed, the term “arrogance” describes a posture or attitude of 
superiority, and it is common to describe the presidency in terms that are synonymous with arrogance. See 
generally SAIKRISHNA B. PRAKASH, IMPERIAL FROM THE BEGINNING: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE (2015) (discussing the origins of the presidency as a strong, aggressive institution); 
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973) (arguing that the office of the 
presidency has exceeded its constitutional boundaries and is out of control). 
9 See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 6-7, 208 (1999) (arguing 
that the branches “construct” constitutional meaning over time). 
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B. The Challenges of Choosing a Metric 
Different metrics can lead to different results. For example, as Eric Posner 
argues, the balance-of-power metaphor for assessing separation-of-powers 
questions can be easily manipulated to produce the analyst’s preferred 
outcomes.10 For formalists, the metaphor is unnecessary because the only 
pertinent question is whether any exercise of power fits within the 
Constitution’s fixed categories of permissible uses or allocations of power. For 
functionalists, the metaphor is superfluous since the principal concern will be 
balancing competing considerations.11 If the metric instead is which branch is 
the most knowledgeable, the question Cass Sunstein poses, the answer is the 
presidency.12 If the metric is which is the least partisan branch, a likely answer 
might be the federal judiciary, the only branch whose top officials are not 
subject to the electoral process and are instead guaranteed life tenure and 
undiminished compensation to protect them from direct political retaliation.13 
If the metric is which is the most efficient branch, the answer will not be 
Congress, since the Framers designed the lawmaking process to be “inefficient” 
and “cumbersome[].”14 How we frame questions can shape the answers.  
 
10 See Eric A. Posner, Balance-of-Powers Arguments, the Structural Constitution, and the Problem of 
“Underenforcement”, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1677 (2016) (discussing the difficulty of determining what 
the balance of power between the three branches was intended to look like).  
11 Posner’s suggested replacement for the balance-of-power metaphor is that we should focus 
on whether bureaucratic innovation is likely to improve policy outcomes. Id. at 1710-11. Yet, this 
solution hardly follows from Posner’s case against the “metaphor” of balance of power commonly 
used in the separation-of-powers analysis. Indeed, his solution seems to be nothing more than 
classical functionalism—or balancing—under a different name. It returns us to the balance of power. 
As Shakespeare famously put it, “[A] rose [b]y any other name would smell as sweet,” WILLIAM 
SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2, or in Gertrude Stein’s version, “[A] rose is a rose is 
a rose,” GERTRUDE STEIN, Sacred Emily, in GEOGRAPHY AND PLAYS 178, 187 (1922).  
12 Cass R. Sunstein, The Most Knowledgeable Branch, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1607 (2016). Sunstein’s 
argument that the presidency is “the most knowledgeable branch” rests on several unproven claims. 
The first is that experts are trustworthy and thus merit considerable discretion in the regulatory 
process. Id. at 1617. Second, he seems to regard that being “generalists” is problematic for members 
of Congress and that their political acumen does not make up for (or disproves) their lack of 
knowledge or intelligence. Id. at 1613-15. Third, he suggests that on regulatory matters, government 
lawyers perform the function of “translators,” but a more apt metaphor is that they are “educators.” 
Id. at 1608. If Congress fails to appreciate the merits of proposed changes in regulatory schemes, it 
is possible the President’s lawyers failed to do their job as educators. Moreover, it is likely that, 
because they are politically savvy, members of Congress can quickly pick up on the extent to which 
administration lawyers hold them in contempt.  
13 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
14 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (noting the “burdens on governmental processes 
that often seem clumsy, inefficient, [and] even unworkable . . . were consciously made by men who had 
lived under a form of government that permitted arbitrary governmental acts to go unchecked”). 
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C. The Metrics for Constitutional Arrogance 
To measure constitutional arrogance, we need a baseline. The Framers 
created the presidency to help fix the Articles of Confederation, which had 
no Executive, and to check Congress, which the Framers regarded as the most 
dangerous branch.15 They did not expect presidential authority to grow, but 
it did.16 Indeed, James Madison explained that the Constitution and other 
laws were necessarily “more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning 
be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and 
adjudications.”17 The Framers’ compromise, in fashioning the Executive, is a 
baseline against which we can measure what has emerged through 
liquidation—the office’s growth through disposing its occupants and investing 
them with the unique capacity to take positive action. Merely being disposed 
to, or attempting to, expand power is not constitutional arrogance. When 
Presidents act upon their disposition to wrest power from other branches, 
they are manifesting constitutional arrogance. 
Liquidations—especially through historical practices—are a potent force 
that helps explain expansions in presidential power. The Constitution does 
not implement itself. Its implementation over time through historical 
practices has constituted federal executive power.18 As political scientists 
Terry Moe and William Howell suggest, presidential power “has grown over 
time and become more consequential.”19 To be sure, the expansion of 
presidential power has not been perfectly uniform or linear, and some powers 
 
15 See generally Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996) 
(discussing James Madison’s view that the Legislature was the most dangerous branch and could 
create a vortex of power, and the Executive was needed to restrict this power). 
16 See SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE, supra note 5, at 20 (positing that each 
President has tried to take charge and exercise his independent powers); Stephen Skowronek, The 
Conservative Insurgency and Presidential Power: A Developmental Perspective on the Unitary Executive, 
122 HARV. L. REV. 2070, 2093-96 (2009) [hereinafter Skowronek, The Conservative Insurgency] 
(tracing the development of the “unitary executive” construction of presidential power and how the 
presidency’s power has grown); see also William P. Marshall, Eleven Reasons Why Presidential Power 
Inevitably Expands and Why It Matters, 88 B.U. L. REV. 505, 507-09 (2008) (explaining the 
significance of the continual expansion of presidential power). 
17 THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 225 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (emphasis 
omitted); see also MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION 174 (2015) (quoting Madison’s declaration that, “the exposition of the Constitution 
is frequently a copious source, and must continue so until its meaning on all great points shall have 
been settled by precedents”) (citation omitted). 
18 See Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 132, 135 (1999) (asserting that the relative powers of the three branches must be 
determined through “the ongoing practice of politics”); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. 
Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 1103-
09 (2013) (illuminating how the scope of the President’s legal authority might be constrained by 
historical practice). 
19 Moe & Howell, supra note 18, at 133. 
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or prerogatives have been curtailed.20 Presidents “move strategically and 
moderately to promote their imperialistic designs—and do so successfully 
over time, gradually shifting the balance of power in their favor.”21 Presidents 
rarely relinquish power they have acquired; instead, they fortify expansions 
in their authority over time.22  
A second factor shaping the growth of presidential power is the 
unintended consequences of the constitutional structure. The executive’s 
unique design, with a single official at its apex, positions Presidents perfectly 
to take positive independent action and invests them with the capacity to do 
so. How often have we heard that the presidency is unique among the 
branches for its energy and efficiency? Even during the ratification campaign, 
this was a common defense of the office.23 Presidents must act. Their 
constitutional duties extend beyond blocking or resisting policies they 
oppose. The forces propelling and keeping Presidents in office push them 
toward taking positive action, not inaction.24 Indeed, Presidents are usually 
punished for inaction. 
Another consequence of the Executive’s hierarchical design is its tendency 
to suppress vigorous disagreement within the office of the presidency. As a 
practical matter, there must be an end to debate within the Oval Office 
because the President’s job is not merely to deliberate but to act. Too much 
dissent or disagreement cannot be long tolerated, much less rewarded. The 
 
20 There are many notable instances in which the Court overturned the unilateral actions of 
Presidents. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (overturning the Bush 
Administration’s decision to hold people as enemy combatants without giving them the opportunity 
to challenge that status before an impartial decisionmaker); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 
703-07 (1974) (requiring the President to comply with a judicial subpoena and ruling that 
presidential aides are entitled only to qualified, rather than absolute, privilege for the purposes of 
maintaining the confidentiality of information produced within the White House); Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585-89 (1952) [hereinafter Steel Seizure] (striking down 
President Truman’s seizure of the nation’s steel mills). 
21 Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A Theory, 29 
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. Dec. 1999, at 850, 871.  
22 See Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, 57 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 28 (1994) (“[W]hen presidents gain new ground, they will not give it back. 
They want control, and every president will protect not only what he has won, but what all past 
presidents have won.”).  
23 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 421-23 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) 
(presenting a defense of the unified executive). 
24 See generally WILLIAM G. HOWELL, ET AL., THE WAR-TIME PRESIDENT: EXECUTIVE 
INFLUENCE AND THE NATIONALIZING POLITICS OF THREAT (2013) (examining how Presidents 
during war are able to increase power at the expense of Congress); ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN 
VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010); Moe & 
Howell, supra note 18, at 136 (“During this same period, moreover, the public began to demand 
positive governmental responses to pressing social problems and to hold the president, as the symbol 
and focus of national leadership, responsible for the successes and failures of government.”).  
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structure facilitates groupthink; the closer people get to the top, the more 
incentives there are to cooperate with or acquiesce to the President.25  
Indeed, the hierarchical design of the Executive Branch necessitates 
rewarding agreement and punishing or discouraging dissent. The organization 
is such that loyalty to the President is frequently rewarded by advancement 
within the government. Loyalty may also be required, as loyalty to the 
President often correlates with one’s position within the executive hierarchy, 
and dissent or disagreement is unlikely to lead to advancement. Hence, the 
presidency is often described as an echo chamber—filled with people inclined 
to tell Presidents what they want to hear.26  
A final factor, facilitating presidential disposition toward constitutional 
arrogance, is constitutional indeterminacy. “[T]he constitutional text on the 
subject [of the presidency] is notoriously unspecific,”27 which, like constitutional 
ambiguities or silence generally, invites Presidents to exploit the text to their 
advantage. Indeed, the President can move more energetically and decisively 
than the other branches to take advantage of constitutional silence and 
ambiguity, particularly in responding to intense political and time pressures. It 
is little wonder that these aspects of the presidency have allowed the presidency 
“to grow with the developing nation.”28 
D. Constraints on Executive Discretion 
One response to the claim that Presidents may be disposed toward 
constitutional arrogance is there are significant checks on presidential 
misconduct, as recognized in Nixon v. Fitzgerald.29 In the course of holding 
that Presidents are absolutely immune from civil suits for damages based on 
their official conduct, the Supreme Court explained that other checks on 
presidential misconduct include impeachment, reelection concerns, the need 
 
25 See generally PAUL A. KOWERT, GROUPTHINK OR DEADLOCK: WHEN DO LEADERS 
LEARN FROM THEIR ADVISORS? (2002) (discussing the dangers of groupthink that arise from 
structures that encourage the reinforcement of the leader’s perspective).  
26 See George C. Edwards, III, Why Not the Best? The Loyalty–Competency Trade-Offs in 
Presidential Appointments, BROOKINGS (2001), http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2001/03/
spring-governance-edwards [https://perma.cc/2ZGN-AD6B] (“A newly elected presidential administration 
places the highest value on an appointee’s unwavering commitment to the president and to his 
programs.”). However, the enforcement scheme is imperfect. See David E. Pozen, The Leaky 
Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. 
L. REV. 512, 544-45 (2013) (discussing the prevalence of high-level leaks and the near-absence of 
formal discipline for leaks); see also infra note 30 and accompanying text. 
27 Marshall, supra note 16, at 509. 
28 BARBARA HINCKLEY, THE SYMBOLIC PRESIDENCY: HOW PRESIDENTS PORTRAY 
THEMSELVES 8 (1990). 
29 See 457 U.S. 731, 758 (1982) (“The existence of alternative remedies and deterrents establishes 
that absolute immunity will not place the President ‘above the law.’”).  
1656 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 165: 1649 
for political support to maintain leverage with Congress, the visibility of the 
presidency, and presidential concern with historical judgment.30 Yet, none of 
these necessarily constrain Presidents’ discretion.31 Second-term Presidents 
are, of course, not formally subject to reelection, though they will share 
concerns about how their legacy will be judged.32 These concerns hardly 
compel Presidents toward inaction. Even Presidents who construe federal 
power narrowly will be pushed, to the extent they care about their legacies, 
to make their marks and strive toward achieving positive accomplishments. 
Every President is tested by some exigency, for which the failure to act is not 
an option. History rewards effort and success above all else. Problems or 
crises must be solved, and subsequent Presidents tend to invest in their 
predecessors’ successful actions or solutions.33  
 
30 See id. at 750-53 (discussing respondent’s arguments for why the President should only have 
qualified immunity and why the “Constitution distinguishes him from other executive officials”); 
see also JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 
9/11 207 (2012) (arguing that besides media coverage, government lawyers and courts help to check 
presidential abuse of power); Bradley & Morrison, supra note 18, at 1121-41 (suggesting that law 
might best constrain presidential conduct by having presidential actions publicly criticized and 
defended in legal terms). Besides asking readers to trust that there are lawyers performing this 
function, Goldsmith mistakes some traction for complete stoppage. Indeed, his short stint as head 
of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) (shortened when he resigned to force the Administration to 
withdraw the much-maligned “torture” memorandum) illustrates a propensity to dismiss rather than 
listen to naysayers within administrations, at least on issues of high salience. See JACK GOLDSMITH, 
THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 9-12, 
161-62 (2009) (discussing Goldsmith’s review of the Bush Administration’s terrorism policy as OLC, 
and his decision to resign because the White House was criticizing his actions to rescind or modify 
so many OLC decisions). Neal Kumar Katyal, an outstanding academic who served in both the 
Clinton and Obama Administrations, makes a similar argument as Professor Goldsmith. See Neal 
Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 
YALE L.J. 2314, 2324-31 (2006) (emphasizing various methods that other executive actors may use 
to limit a President’s power). Nonetheless, we should not forget that Presidents appoint key 
decisionmakers, who presumably are chosen based in part on their commitments to the President’s 
agenda. Given that the President expects key decisionmakers to do whatever they can to implement 
his constitutional vision, the key question is how often do Presidents, or administrations, agree not 
to do something that they wanted to do because their lawyers told them not to do it. We do not 
know the answer, at least not definitively. We know that President Obama pledged as a candidate 
to close Guantanamo Bay but begrudgingly concluded later, based on legal advice, that he could not 
do it. However, we do not know on how many other occasions the President was dissuaded from 
doing something he wanted to do because his lawyers told him not to do it.  
31 I am using a functional understanding of constraint similar to the one Bradley and Morrison 
use. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 18, at 1121-22 (defining “constraint of law” as “when it exerts 
some force on decisionmaking because of its status as law”) (emphasis in original).  
32 See Moe & Howell, supra note 18, at 136 (“Broadly speaking, however, it is fair to say that 
most presidents have put great emphasis on their legacies and, in particular, on being regarded in 
the eyes of history as strong and effective leaders.”). 
33 See generally Julian Zelizer, You Can’t Game a Presidential Legacy, CNN (Dec. 2, 2013, 7:55 
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/02/opinion/zelizer-presidential-legacy/ [https://perma.cc/2J9N-FVL7]; 
Jim Huffman, Leave the President’s Legacy to Historians, DAILY CALLER (Oct. 16, 2014), http://
dailycaller.com/2014/10/16/leave-the-presidents-legacy-to-historians/ [https://perma.cc/9A6G-9FXJ]. 
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As for media coverage, most presidential action actually occurs under the 
radar, where it is not subject to public scrutiny. On high-profile, politically 
salient matters, such as war, civil rights, or health care, Presidents are subject 
to media coverage, but the proliferation of soft news (commentary rather than 
reporting hard data) and the public’s limited attention span and preference 
for entertainment undermine its appreciation of what Presidents have 
actually done.34 Indeed, much of what Presidents do gets reported after it is 
already done. By the time the American public figures out whether something 
important has happened, the pertinent deliberations and action are often 
already in the past.  
Regarding Presidents’ need for congressional support to get preferred 
policies enacted, much depends on who controls Congress. But congressional 
and popular support are not synonymous. Of the two, public support is more 
important,35 and it is common for Presidents to bypass Congress, just as 
President Clinton cultivated popular support at Congress’s expense through 
the “third way.”36 It is through such exercises of unilateral power that Presidents 
are most able to displace Congress and expand control over policymaking. The 
next Part examines three examples of Presidents trying to do just that.  
II. THREE EXAMPLES OF THE PUSH TOWARD              
CONSTITUTIONAL ARROGANCE 
In this Part, I move from general patterns in presidential performance to 
concrete illustrations of Presidents’ propensity and capacity for constitutional 
arrogance. I use three case studies to illustrate specific instances in which 
 
34 See, e.g., ALISON DAGNES, POLITICS ON DEMAND: THE EFFECTS OF 24-HOUR NEWS ON 
AMERICAN POLITICS 77 (2010) (noting that soft news has reduced the amount news organizations 
budget to specialists like foreign reporters, leading to news that is more entertaining but “less 
extensive than it used to be”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: HOW MANY MINDS PRODUCE 
KNOWLEDGE 147-196 (2006) (discussing how blogs are beneficial because they bring a large amount 
of information to light, but demonstrate the problems with deliberation); Markus Prior, Any Good 
News in Soft News? The Impact of Soft News Preference on Political Knowledge, 20 POL. COMM. 149, 168 
(2003) (noting that while soft news may encourage more people to watch due to its entertaining 
aspects, evidence is limited that viewers actually learn from soft news—and any positive 
consequences of soft news regarding the political process remain to be demonstrated). But see 
Matthew A. Baum & Angela S. Jamison, The Oprah Effect: How Soft News Helps Inattentive Citizens 
Vote Consistently, 68 J. OF POL. 946, 957 (2006) (arguing that the use of soft news may facilitate 
voting competence among at least some citizens). 
35 See JAMES DRUCKMAN & LAWRENCE JACOBS, WHO GOVERNS? PRESIDENTS, PUBLIC 
OPINION, AND MANIPULATION 21-40 (2015) (discussing how Presidents strategically court and 
track public opinion). 
36 See STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP IN POLITICAL TIME: REPRISE 
AND REAPPRAISAL 108 (2008) (describing Presidents undertaking “the third way” as “exemplify[ing] 
political stances carefully crafted to sidestep established conceptions of the nation’s political 
alternatives and to reach out beyond the President’s traditional party base toward some new and 
largely inchoate combination”).  
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Presidents have undertaken unilateral actions with the purpose or effect of 
displacing legislative action and expanding control over policymaking. Such 
efforts could be called arrogations of power.  
A. Recess Appointments 
Recess appointments are a good case study for presidential propensity and 
capacity for constitutional arrogance because they involve an express power 
whose scope has been constructed over time. The Constitution provides that 
the President may “fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of 
the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of [the 
Senate’s] next Session.”37 The Constitution does not define the terms “recess” 
or “may happen.”38 A narrow reading, favored by some originalists, maintains 
that the power only applied to vacancies that both arose during intersession 
recesses (and thus were strictly within Congress’s power to control) and 
needed to be filled during the recess to prevent important offices from 
remaining unfilled for long periods of time.39  
Presidents wasted little time in trying to extend the power’s boundaries. 
For example, the first President, George Washington, made three recess 
appointments, including John Rutledge as Chief Justice of the United 
States.40 President Washington plausibly maintained the power applied to “all 
Vacancies that may happen during the Recess,”41 and the chief justiceship had 
become vacant at the end of June 1795 when the Senate was not in session.42 
Yet, the appointment elided the problem of vesting Article III power in 
 
37 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
38 See generally HENRY B. HOGUE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21308, RECESS APPOINTMENTS: 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2013) (outlining the basic functioning of recess appointments); 
Josh Chafetz, A Fourth Way? Bringing Politics Back into Recess Appointments (and the Rest of the 
Separation of Powers, Too), 64 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 161 (2015) (proposing a multiplicity viewpoint that 
would allow politics to pervade the recess appointment arena). 
39 See, e.g., Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, NLRB 
v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) (No. 12-1281) (supporting an originalist interpretation); Michael 
McConnell, Democrats and Executive Overreach, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424052970204257504577150661990141658 [https://perma.cc/MH53-GW2H] (criticizing 
President Obama’s use of recess appointments); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, at 408 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (arguing that the Framers created the recess appointment 
power because “it would have been improper to oblige [the Senate] to be continually in session for the 
appointment of officers, and as vacancies might happen in their recess, which it might be necessary for 
the public service to fill without delay”). 
40 Henry J. Abraham, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF U.S. SUPREME 
COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II 58-59 (2008). 
41 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
42 See generally MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (2000) [hereinafter GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL 
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS] (describing how allegiance to a party’s political agenda was why the 
Senate voted down Washington’s first nomination of Rutledge to the Supreme Court). 
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someone who lacked Article III protections. While the appointment arguably 
violated the Constitution, subsequent Presidents adopted Washington’s 
extension of the power and made over twenty recess appointments to Article 
III courts, including President Eisenhower’s recess appointment of Earl 
Warren as Chief Justice and President George W. Bush’s recess appointments 
of three federal circuit court judges.  
While President Jefferson’s Attorney General concluded the recess 
appointment power applied only to certain vacancies arising during 
recesses,43 President James Monroe’s Attorney General, William Wirt, 
reached the opposite conclusion, arguing that the phrase “may happen” was 
“not perfectly clear,” since it could mean either “happen to take place” or 
“happen to exist.”44 Wirt maintained that understanding the phrase to mean 
“happen to take place” was “most accordant with the letter of the 
constitution.”45 Based on the same rationale, President Zachary Taylor made 
over 400 recess appointments to executive positions.46  
Subsequent Presidents followed the same course, expanding the 
opportunities for Presidents to exercise this formal authority. In 1901, 
President Theodore Roosevelt rejected his Attorney General’s advice47 that 
the clause did not apply to intrasession recesses and made 160 such 
appointments (although mostly military appointments) when the Senate was 
not in formal recess.48 Though the Senate Judiciary Committee rebuked 
President Roosevelt,49 the appointments stood, and then in 1921 President 
Warren Harding’s Attorney General Harry Daugherty opined that Presidents 
 
43 See Edmund Randolph, Opinion on Recess Appointments (July 7, 1792) (discussing how 
Randolph concluded that since the vacancy for the newly created position Chief Coiner of the Mint 
had occurred on the day the office was created, it could not be filled as a recess appointment) in 24 
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 165-67 (John Catanzariti et al. eds., 1990).  
44 Exec. Auth. to Fill Vacancies, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 631, 631-32 (1823). 
45 Id. 
46 The Senate blocked President Taylor from filling numerous executive positions in retaliation 
against his controversial plan for Congress to admit two new states, which would have thrown off 
the balance of power in Congress between pro-slavery and anti-slavery forces. See MICHAEL J. 
GERHARDT, THE FORGOTTEN PRESIDENTS: THEIR UNTOLD CONSTITUTIONAL LEGACY 73-74 
(2013) [hereinafter GERHARDT, THE FORGOTTEN PRESIDENTS] (discussing how “Taylor made 
428 recess appointments, more than all the recess appointments made by the eleven previous 
presidents” combined). 
47 See President—Appointment of Officers—Holiday Recess, 23 Op. Att’y Gen. 599, 599-604 
(1901) (describing the reasoning of Attorney General Knox for why the “President is not authorized 
to appoint an appraiser at the port of New York during the current holiday adjournment of the 
Senate, which will have the effect of an appointment made in the recess occurring between two 
sessions of the Senate”). 
48 See generally Henry B. Hogue, The Law: Recess Appointments to Article III Courts, 34 
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. Sept. 2004, at 656 (providing an overview of recess appointments and 
discussing President George W. Bush’s recess appointments and placing them in historical context). 
49 S. REP. NO. 58-4389, at 4 (1905). 
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have the authority to make recess appointments during intrasession recesses.50 
Subsequently, Presidents have made recess appointments during intrasession 
breaks leaving the principal question to be resolved how short in time the break 
between intrasessions must be to qualify as a recess for Article II purposes.  
President Barack Obama pressed this question. Backed by an opinion from 
his Office of Legal Council (OLC),51 he claimed the authority to make recess 
appointments during three-day breaks. The Senate was holding pro forma 
sessions to frustrate his recess appointment authority and was refusing to confirm 
any of his nominees to three vacant positions on the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB). To ensure the enforcement of labor laws that would have gone 
unenforced otherwise, the President filled the positions with recess appointments. 
In NLRB v. Noel Canning, the Supreme Court overturned the President’s 
recess appointments and ruled that the three-day break between intrasessions 
was not sufficiently long to comprise a “recess” for purposes of making those 
appointments.52 The majority said it had not found a single instance in which 
an intrasession recess appointment had been made during a break of less than 
ten days.53 “The lack of examples,” the majority inferred, “suggests that the 
recess-appointment power is not needed in that context.”54 While the Court 
overturned Obama’s three National Labor Relations Board appointments, it 
endorsed the longstanding practice in which Presidents made recess 
appointments during breaks of at least ten days.  
Noel Canning is hardly a complete loss for Presidents. While it took both the 
Supreme Court and the Senate together to define the outer limits of Presidents’ 
recess-appointment power, Presidents secured an enduring victory—entrenching 
 
50 See Exec. Power—Recess Appointments, 33 Op. Att’y Gen. 20-25 (1921) (describing Attorney 
General Dougherty’s reasoning for why the President has the authority to make an intrasession 
appointment to a position where the vacancy was created before the recess begun, but still exists 
during the recess period). 
51 See generally Memorandum Op. for the Counsel to the President, Lawfulness of Recess 
Appointments During a Recess of the Senate Notwithstanding Periodic Pro Forma Sessions, 36 Op. 
O.L.C. 1 (2012), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2012/01/03/pro-forma-sessions
-opinion.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7TX-HV86] (describing Assistant Attorney General Seitz’s rationale 
for why “the convening of periodic pro forma sessions in which no business is to be conducted does 
not have the legal effect of interrupting an intrasession recess otherwise long enough to qualify as a 
‘Recess of the Senate’ under the Recess Appointments Clause”).  
52 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2574 (2014). The importance of the three-day figure derives from the fact 
that the Constitution does not require the House or Senate to obtain the consent of the other to 
adjourn unless the break is longer than three days. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4. Near the end of 
President Obama’s second term, the Republicans controlled the House but not the Senate and the 
House insisted on the pro forma sessions as a condition of its constitutionally-required consent to 
Senate adjournments of longer than three days. See Jennifer Steinhauer, Sometimes a Day in Congress 
Takes Seconds, Gavel to Gavel, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2011, at A12.  
53 Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2566. 
54 Id. 
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into constitutional law their practice of making recess appointments during 
Senate breaks of at least ten days, regardless of when or why they became vacant. 
The decision incentivizes Presidents to explore how to maneuver around pro 
forma sessions, which are blocking their permanent and recess appointments.55 
Presidents may name acting officials to high–ranking executive offices, 
though such officials are unlikely to wield the same influence as permanent 
appointees to the positions. Presidents might look for Senate breaks of at 
least ten days, try to mobilize public support and achieve the same ends 
through other unilateral actions, or help their party gain Senate control.56 
Since constitutional arrogance is most likely to be manifested through 
Presidents’ unilateral actions, each of the next two case studies examines 
instances of such actions being undertaken to expand Presidents’ control over 
policymaking at Congress’s expense.  
B. Removal Power 
Although removal is one of the President’s most potent weapons, the 
Constitution is silent on the power. Drawing inferences from the unique 
design of the executive branch (with only one person in charge) and the 
Presidents’ constitutional obligation to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed,”57 Presidents have defended their need for the power of removal to 
ensure their agents comply with their agendas and to reward allies or friends 
with patronage.58 Members of Congress have similar interests, seeking to 
 
55 The Senate’s pro forma sessions could arguably be characterized as offensive, having the plain 
purpose and effect of frustrating the President’s recess appointment authority. On this perspective, 
President Obama’s attempted recess appointments could be viewed as a defensive measure, as 
pushback against the Senate’s constitutional arrogance, i.e., its brazen attempt to frustrate his recess 
appointment authority. Yet, the President’s actions could also be described, within the context of 
presidential efforts to expand the opportunities to make recess appointments, as an attempt to 
reconstruct the boundaries of his authority. While it is tempting to think the tiebreaking authority 
should go to the Court, particularly since it aligned with the Senate in this conflict against the 
President, the Court is hardly infallible. Hence, the determination of which acts are offensive and 
which are defensive, and which acts are manifestations of constitutional arrogance and which are 
not, depends on the only constraint that transcends the power of any of the branches of the federal 
government—the judgment of history, which includes the choices leaders make to follow—or not 
follow—the actions of their predecessors in office. 
56 Despite President Obama’s efforts to find nominees who were trustworthy and confirmable, 
Democrats undid the practice of allowing filibusters of judicial and executive nominations once they 
regained the majority. Ramsey Cox, Senate Confirms All Five NLRB Members, THE HILL: FLOOR 
ACTION (July 30, 2013, 10:15 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/314503-senate-
votes-to-confirm-all-five-nlrb-members [https://perma.cc/N8PA-XMRY]; see also HAROLD H. 
BRUFF, UNTRODDEN GROUND: HOW PRESIDENTS INTERPRET THE CONSTITUTION 452-53 
(2015) (discussing the controversy and offering a constitutional outlook). 
57 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
58 See generally Neomi Rao, Removal: Necessary and Sufficient for Presidential Control, 65 ALA. L. 
REV. 1205, 1227-28 (2014) (explaining why Presidents need removal power to control their subordinates). 
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create openings for their allies or making it harder for them to be replaced. 
Congress has asserted the authority to condition or bar presidential removal 
authority over various offices based on its powers to create and fund federal 
offices and the Senate’s power to provide its “Advice and Consent” to 
presidential nominations to certain offices.59 Congress and the President have 
thus found themselves in a persistent struggle for control over removal.60  
Two battles have shaped presidential removal power. The first involves 
the century-long dispute over the Tenure in Office Act’s restrictions on 
presidential authority to dismiss certain executive branch officials. The other 
involves Presidents’ inability to discharge the heads of independent agencies.  
The dispute over the Tenure in Office Act is well known,61 though it 
remains significant because its resolution strongly favors presidential power. 
Initially, Presidents were unsure of the extent to which the law threatened 
their prerogatives, as it required limited tenures and required rotation in 
various offices.62 President James Madison considered the restrictions to 
impede presidential authority,63 but President Andrew Jackson backed the law 
because it allowed rotation in office, which he filled with patronage.64 When 
Congress reauthorized the law in 1867 to cover all executive offices, the threat 
to presidential authority became clear. When President Andrew Johnson 
vetoed the law because he believed it impermissibly restricted the scope of 
 
59 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
60 On the removal power, see generally GERHARDT, THE FORGOTTEN PRESIDENTS, supra 
note 46, at 18-19, 31-35, 133-34, 137-38, 168-71; Aziz Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. 
REV. 1 (2013); Saikrishna B. Prakash, Removal and Tenure in Office, 92 VA. L. REV. 1779 (2006). 
61 See generally GERHARDT, THE FORGOTTEN PRESIDENTS supra note 46, at 32, 33, 117, 133-
38, 169-70; GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS, supra note 42, at 34, 53-54. 
62 For the early history of the Tenure in Office Act, see GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL 
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS, supra note 42, at 53-54, discussing the spoils system of the Act which 
“provided that district attorneys and the principal officers who had responsibility for collecting and 
disbursing money should thenceforth be appointed to serve fixed terms of four years.” See also J. 
DAVID ALVIS, ET AL., THE CONTESTED REMOVAL POWER, 1789–2010 62-65 (2013) (discussing 
the origins and early days of the Act). 
63 This opposition tracks Madison’s long-held views on the robustness of presidential removal 
authority. See BILDER, supra note 17, at 172-73 (discussing how Madison was the “principal 
spokesperson favoring executive removal power”). 
64 See ROBERT V. REMINI, THE LIFE OF ANDREW JACKSON 201-205, 269, 276-77 (1988) 
(describing how President Jackson dismissed all but one member of his cabinet near the end of his 
first term and faced censure for withholding documents pertaining to his defunding the National 
Bank). President Tyler was equally aggressive in exercising presidential prerogatives, particularly 
his veto and removal authorities, and faced impeachment for refusing to tell the House of 
Representatives the names of people he had considered for appointments. GERHARDT, THE 
FORGOTTEN PRESIDENTS, supra note 46, at 50-55. These actions helped to construct the respective 
scope of presidential nominating, removal powers, and executive privilege. The significance of these 
and other acts of constitutional arrogance depends on how they fit into institutional patterns of 
constitutional decisionmaking over time. 
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presidential removal authority, Congress overrode his veto.65 When Johnson 
fired his Secretary of War Edwin Stanton without following the act’s 
requirements, the House impeached him.66 The fact that the Senate fell one 
vote short of removing Johnson has been understood as rejecting the use of 
impeachment to punish Presidents for good-faith disagreements with Congress 
over policymaking.67 Subsequent Presidents agreed the law was unconstitutional, 
culminating in its repeal under President Cleveland and the Supreme Court 
upholding Cleveland’s refusal to comply with its requirements before firing 
and replacing a United States Attorney.68 By the time the constitutionality of 
an analogous statute came before the Court in Myers v. United States,69 the 
Tenure in Office Act was already dead. The Court buried similar laws for good.70  
In the same era, another battle was already under way—over the extent to 
which Congress could restrict presidential removal authority over the heads 
of independent agencies. Though Presidents have fared less well in this 
battle, the decisions are only part of the story. In an important early case, 
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States,71 the Court upheld “[t]he authority of 
Congress . . . to fix the period during which [Commissioners on the Federal 
Trade Commission, who wield quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers] 
shall continue [in office], and to forbid their removal except for cause in the 
meantime.”72 One subsequent challenge involved whether all executive 
functions had to be under the President’s control or whether some could be 
placed beyond the reach of his removal power. When Congress vested an 
executive function in an official whom the Court found Congress could 
remove, the Court struck the mechanism down.73 But, when Congress 
vested quintessential executive authority (prosecutorial discretion) in an 
 
65 See BRUFF, supra note 56, at 169-70. 
66 On the impeachment of President Johnson and its constitutional ramifications, see generally 
WHITTINGTON, supra note 9, at 113-57. 
67 See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF 
JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 240-44 (1992) (citing the writings 
of congressmen who explained why they voted not to impeach the President, particularly Senator 
William Fessenden who explained that “the Tenure of Office Act properly interpreted did not apply 
to protect Stanton’s office. But [Fessenden] said that even if he were wrong on this point, the 
application of the act to Stanton was at least highly debatable, so that the president should not be 
removed from office because he had put the wrong interpretation on the statute”). 
68 Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324, 344 (1897). 
69 See 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (striking down a 1876 federal law requiring that postmasters be appointed 
and removed by Presidents with the advice and consent of the Senate). 
70 In Myers, Chief Justice Taft, who had served over a decade earlier as President, found that 
removal power was implicit in the President’s authority and held unconstitutional the Tenure in 
Office Act, even though it was not technically at issue. Id. at 176-77.  
71 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
72 Id. at 629. 
73 See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (striking down a mechanism empowering the Comptroller 
General to make cuts in appropriations if the deficit exceeded its permissible range). 
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independent counsel beyond presidential or congressional control, the Court 
upheld the mechanism with a 7-1 vote in Morrison v. Olsen.74 Dissenting, 
Justice Scalia argued that the law impermissibly allowed the unchecked 
exercise of executive power.75  
Since Congress allowed the law to lapse near the end of President 
Clinton’s Administration,76 the Court has weakened Morrison,77 perhaps most 
significantly in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board.78 
There, the Court invalidated a procedure by which members of a special 
oversight board, supervised by the Securities and Exchange Commission, an 
independent agency, could only be removed under a “rigorous good-cause 
standard,” which the President was barred from invoking.79 The Court 
declared Humphrey’s Executor and Morrison only upheld limited restrictions 
on the President’s removal power, where only “one level of protected tenure 
separated the President from an officer exercising executive power.”80 The 
problem with removal of the board’s members was that, “[w]ith the second 
layer [of protection from presidential removal] in place, the [SEC] can shield 
its decision from Presidential review by finding that good cause is absent—a 
finding that, given the Commission’s own protected tenure, the President 
cannot easily overturn.”81 
In the aftermath of both Morrison’s weakening and Noel Canning, 
Presidents may consider several ways to influence the heads of independent 
agencies. These are reminders that, when one path is blocked, Presidents will 
often seek other means to accomplish their preferred ends.  
First, Presidents act strategically in making appointments. The appeals of 
party allegiance and patronage remain strong for ensuring loyalty and 
rewarding support,82 but how Presidents use patronage in making agency 
 
74 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
75 Id. at 698-785 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Controversially, Justice Scalia’s dissent endorsed the 
unitary theory of the executive, which holds that all executive power should be under the direct 
control of the President. See generally STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE 
UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008). The 
theory, at least in its most robust form, spells trouble for the constitutionality of independent 
agencies, since it would require holding unconstitutional arrangements in which Congress vested 
executive authority in officials whom the President cannot remove at will. 
76 See KEN GORMLEY, THE DEATH OF AMERICAN VIRTUE 655 (2010). 
77 See, e.g., Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 661 (1997) (constructing the Court’s “test” 
for determining when people are inferior officers for Appointments Clause purposes, which Justice 
Scalia said “Morrison did not purport to set forth”).  
78 561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
79 Id. at 496. 
80 Id. at 495. 
81 Id. at 497 n.4. The Court concluded its judgment had minimal impact on administrative 
arrangements in which officials were exercising executive power. Id. at 503. 
82 One arguable check on presidential discretion is political parties. Under our party system, 
Presidents are the titular heads of the political parties that nominated them and are expected to 
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appointments depends on Presidents’ agendas, the extent of agencies’ 
importance to Presidents’ policy views, and whether agencies require high 
levels of professionalism or expertise in their management.83 For agencies 
that are unimportant to Presidents’ agendas but whose missions share their 
policy views, Presidents make appointments based more on loyalty or other 
political considerations than demonstrated expertise.84 Where agencies are 
important to Presidents’ agendas, but whose missions do not share their 
policy views, Presidents make appointments based on expertise, prior 
experience, and ideology.85 Second, Presidents may threaten to cut funding 
(which is obviously not unilateral) or use “jawboning” to influence the heads 
of independent agencies.86 Effectively, Presidents (or their surrogates) try to 
influence these officials through personal interaction.87 Third, the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), situated in the White House,88 
has helped to coordinate executive agencies’ compliance with the regulatory 
principles set forth in executive orders since 1993.89 Because Presidents lack 
removal authority over the heads of independent agencies and some 
 
implement their agendas. At the same time, the parties exert pressure on Presidents to pursue 
certain policies and objectives and to use party loyalty as a basis for making appointments. See 
SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE, supra note 5, at 198-204, 289-90. 
83 See generally DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS: POLITICAL 
CONTROL AND BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE (2008); Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So 
Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459 (2008). 
84 See Gary E. Hollibaugh Jr., et al., Presidents and Patronage, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1024, 1026 
(2014) (citing arguments that “high-priority departments and agencies receive more appointees 
selected for loyalty and other political reasons—and fewer selected for demonstrated agency 
experience—due to presidential desires for responsiveness and distrust of experienced bureaucrats”).  
85 See id. at 1036 (citing arguments “that presidents are more likely to place appointees selected 
for electoral or political reasons in agencies that share the president’s policy views, are low on the 
president’s agenda, and to positions that have little influence on policy outputs”); see also 
GERHARDT, THE FORGOTTEN PRESIDENTS, supra note 46, at 196 (describing how President 
Coolidge appointed people as heads of agencies and commissions who “opposed or were highly 
skeptical of the basic missions of the agencies that they were appointed to administer” in a 
“concerted strategy” to weaken the impact of those agencies); Howell Raines, Reagan Reversing Many 
U.S. Policies, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 1981), http://www.nytimes.com/1981/07/03/us/reagan-reversing-
many-us-policies.html [https://perma.cc/U3QM-N6J3] (describing various Reagan appointees who 
shared his pro-business policies). 
86 See Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 
80 COLUM. L. REV. 943, 943 n.1 (1980) (explaining that “[j]awboning” “became part of the political 
lexicon when President Kennedy sought to restrain prices and wages in the steel industry”). 
87 See id. at 943 (describing how “the President may have the power to act directly, but he 
prefers for political reasons to cajole, persuade, or arbitrate”). 
88 See generally CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32397, FEDERAL 
RULEMAKING: THE ROLE OF THE OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS (2009). 
89 Id.; see Nina A. Mendelson & Jonathan B. Wiener, Responding to Agency Avoidance of OIRA, 
37 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 447, 454-63 (2014) (discussing the presidential use of centralized 
regulatory review through OIRA to advance policy goals). 
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(particularly independent) agencies avoid OIRA,90 Presidents might try to 
mobilize public pressure on such agencies, like President Obama has done 
through executive orders and public statements prompting the Federal 
Communications Commission to consider implementing the “strongest 
possible rules” to preserve net neutrality.91 The third case study further 
explores the constitutional ramifications of unilateral executive action.92 
C. Immigration 
The final case study of constitutional arrogance is the executive actions of 
the Secretary of Homeland Security on immigration, which presumably were 
done with the approval (if not under the direction) of the President and which 
attempted to wrest lawmaking control from Congress. The conventional 
scenario has Congress acting first to make policy, placing the burden on the 
President to sign into law what Congress approved or veto it, and otherwise 
leaving some enforcement discretion to the President. But the Administration’s 
executive actions on immigration occupied a void resulting from Congress’s 
failure to enact a law in the first place that would have shielded millions of 
undocumented immigrants from deportation. Thus, the actions of the 
Secretary of Homeland Security effectively put the onus on other branches 
to oppose the Executive’s actions through conventional means or risk, 
through their failure to do so, having the President’s actions become law.93  
Shortly after his reelection, President Obama made immigration reform 
a top priority and sent a proposal to the Senate, which enacted a reform bill.94 
 
90 See id. at 450 (describing agency avoidance of OIRA and proposing a method of systematic 
evaulation of various measures in response); id. at 460-61 (“[T]hough not insisting on extending 
regulatory review obligations to independent agencies,” President Obama’s Executive Order 13,579 
directed “that ‘independent regulatory agencies should comply’ with regulatory requirements imposed 
by earlier executive orders . . . . A number of independent agencies appear to have . . . done some 
retrospective review and cost-benefit analysis in response. Full-blown regulatory review for independent 
agencies is on the horizon, though its arrival will depend on several factors, including legal reasoning, 
presidential elections, presidential relations with Congress, and the perceived burden of regulations 
issued by the independent agencies”) (footnotes and citations omitted).  
91 Lauren Carroll, FCC Approves Obama’s Net Neutrality Proposal, POLITIFACT (Feb. 26, 2015, 
5:54 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/promises/obameter/promise/510/support-network-
neutrality-on-the-internet/ [https://perma.cc/2V9N-Z72Z]. 
92 Another notable example of the importance of loyalty and ideology as grounds for 
nomination or appointment is the tradition that all U.S. Attorneys tender their resignations at the 
beginning of every new administration. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.  
93 See generally infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text. 
94 For an excellent overview of the events culminating in these executive actions, and offering 
a defense of them, see generally Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and 
Immigration Law Redux, 125 YALE L.J. 104 (2015). Before the Administration acted unilaterally, 
Professors Cox and Rodríguez had laid out the legal framework for such action on immigration. See 
Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 465 
(2009) (arguing that the asymmetrical power distribution among the three branches of the federal 
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Several months later, it was clear the House would not act on the Senate bill. 
The next year, President Obama acknowledged, “I can’t do these things just 
by myself.”95 But, on November 19, 2014, he effectively overhauled immigration 
through two executive actions.96  
So, what changed? One thing that did not change was the law. What 
changed was the necessity for action.97  
Something else changed, too. The dynamics in policymaking changed. By 
acting unilaterally, President Obama presented the other branches with three 
options. The first was allowing the next President to extend or vacate the 
Obama Administration’s unilateral actions. Since that would not have 
happened before the next President’s inauguration, this option would work, 
at least in the short-term, to the President’s advantage.  
The second option was for Congress to override President Obama’s actions. 
Because the executive actions made President Obama’s positions known to 
Congress, he would have likely vetoed any bill attempting to cancel them. 
Consequently, Congress needed supermajorities in each chamber to override 
any veto. Given that legislative inaction is the norm even when only a majority 
is required for legislative action,98 this option clearly favors the President.99  
 
government concerning immigration law could be addressed by a formal delegation of power to the 
President by Congress).  
95 Katie Pavlich, His Own Words: Obama Said He Doesn’t Have Authority for Executive Amnesty 
22 Times, TOWNHALL (Nov. 19, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://townhall.com/tipsheet/katiepavlich/2014/11/19/jon-
karl-does-obama-think-hes-emperor-of-the-united-states-n1920606 [https://perma.cc/RGT2-GDBW]. 
96 Michael D. Shear, Obama Moves Ahead on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2014, at A1. 
Shortly before the President announced his actions, the Office of Legal Counsel released its 
memorandum supporting them. The Dep’t of Homeland Sec.’s Auth. to Prioritize Removal of 
Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Deter Removal of Others, 38 Op. 
O.L.C. (2014), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/attachments/2014/11/20/2014
-11-19-auth-prioritize-removal.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7DF-GKMX].  
97 As with President Obama’s executive order on gun control, see Memorandumon Promoting 
Smart Gun Technology, 2016 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. (Jan. 4, 2016), the impetus for presidential 
action might be the belief that Congress is dysfunctional. On immigration, the President seems to 
have said as much. See, e.g., Remarks on Immigration Reform, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 
(June 30, 2014) (“[T]he problem is, is that our system is so broken, so unclear, that folks don’t know 
what the rules are.”). The idea that Congress is a broken branch, and that this brokenness enables 
greater presidential adventurism, fully comports with the concept of constitutional arrogance. See 
Remarks in Las Vegas, Nevada, 2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. (Oct. 24, 2011) (“[W]e can’t wait for 
an increasingly dysfunctional Congress to do its job. Where they won’t act, I will.”); see also Charlie 
Savage, Shift on Executive Power Lets Obama Bypass Rivals, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2012, at A1 (“Mr. 
Obama has emphasized the fact that he is bypassing lawmakers.”). Presidents have enormous incentive 
to displace or act despite Congress when Congress is unable to defend itself or unwilling to act. See id. 
98 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958-59 (1983) (“[I]t is crystal clear from the records of the 
[Constitutional] Convention . . . that the Framers ranked other values higher than efficiency . . . . There 
is unmistakable expression of a determination that legislation by the national Congress be a step-by-step, 
deliberate and deliberative process.”). 
99 See Moe & Howell, supra note 18, at 146-48 (explaining why it is so difficult for Congress to 
respond when Presidents act unilaterally). 
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The final option was judicial review, which turned out to be the most 
promising for opponents of the Administration’s immigration actions. On 
January 19, 2016, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider several 
questions, including whether a state had Article III standing to challenge the 
President’s decision not to prosecute an entire class of people rather than 
specific individuals as illegal aliens, whether the President’s decision complies 
with administrative rulemaking requirements, and whether the Executive’s 
decision violates the Take Care Clause.100 Rather than resolve these questions 
one way or another, the Court did neither. After Justice Antonin Scalia’s 
unexpected death in February 2016101 and Senate leaders’ resistance to conduct 
any confirmation hearings for President Obama’s nomination of D.C. Circuit 
Judge Merrick Garland to fill the vacant seat,102 the Court split evenly 4-4 in 
the case, reaffirming the Fifth Circuit’s ruling to stay the Administration from 
implementing the new policies anywhere within the United States.103 
The Court’s nondecision has left the Administration with limited options: 
it could file a petition for rehearing, which would not be considered until next 
Term; appeal the lower court’s judgment on the merits, which would also not 
be considered until the next Term; seek a declaration in other courts around 
the country that the judgment of the District Court in Texas should not be 
extended outside of the Fifth Circuit; or amend the Secretary’s actions, such 
as complying with the requirements for notice-and-comment rulemaking. 
While each of these options would take some time (the third perhaps the 
longest of all), none may happen more quickly than the presidential and 
senatorial elections this fall, whose outcomes will undoubtedly have an effect 
on both whether and when the Senate confirms a ninth Justice. If the next 
Administration wants to reaffirm or extend the Obama Administration’s 
immigration actions, then we can expect its fate will be determined more by 
politics—the voters’ choices in the fall elections and the Justice whom the 
Senate confirms to take Justice Scalia’s seat—than the law.  
If the legality of the Obama Administration’s immigration actions come 
before a full Court, whenever that might be, the possible outcomes are clear. 
If the full Court defers to or upholds the immigration actions (both 
 
100 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 84 U.S.L.W. 3306 (U.S. 
Jan. 19, 2016) (No. 15-674).  
101 Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/anotnin-scalia-death.html [https://perma.cc/D7NZ-Y6YM].  
102 See Mark Landler & Peter Baker, Battle Begins Over Naming Next Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/politics/battle-begins-over-naming-next-justice.html [http
s://perma.cc/8H6J-TGWB]; Jeff Mason & Richard Cowan, Obama Picks Centrist High Court Nominee; 
Republicans Unmoved, REUTERS (Mar. 17, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-obama-
idUSKCN0WI03D [https://perma.cc/A6S3-J7M7].  
103 See United States v. Texas, No. 15-674, slip op. at 1 (U.S. June 23, 2016) (per curiam) (“The 
judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court.”).  
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procedurally and constitutionally), it will reinforce the breadth of a 
President’s discretion in how to go about enforcing the law. If the full Court 
were to overturn the President’s decision, its ruling would likely be an 
important step toward clarifying the boundaries of presidential discretion on 
reinterpreting the law in the course of enforcing the law.104 Just how 
significant or extensive this step may be will depend on the grounds and 
narrowness or breadth of the Court’s decision, subsequent monitoring by the 
Congress and the federal judiciary, and the President’s determination and 
capacity to maneuver around any negative judicial opinion and to take 
advantage of the discretion he—or she—retains, by virtue of his or her office, 
to be creative in enforcing the law.105 The final Part considers further the 
significance of these factors as meaningful constraints on presidential discretion. 
III. THE BOUNDARIES ON PRESIDENTIAL DISCRETION  
In this Part, I revisit the historical practices shaping presidential 
discretion and power. I focus on the strongest possible constraints on the 
propensity and capacity for constitutional arrogance, as reflected in the case 
studies—judicial review, public opinion, concerns about the judgment of 
history, and constitutional conventions.  
A. The Limits of Judicial Review 
This Section begins where Part II ended, with judicial review. The courts 
generally—and the Supreme Court in particular—defer to administrative 
agencies106 and uphold executive actions more often than not.107 Moreover, 
losses in court are not necessarily final. Adverse rulings mean the laws of 
particular cases disfavored the President, but Presidents still retain substantial 
discretion on the degree of their compliance with unfavorable judicial 
 
104 The question of at what point purported enforcement of the law ceases to be executive but 
rather becomes legislative action is difficult but not unprecedented. See Clinton v. City of New 
York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998); see also Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). In our symposium, Professor 
Bellia takes this issue head-on. See Patricia Bellia, Faithful Execution and Enforcement Discretion, 164 
U. PA. L. REV. 1753 (2016). 
105 Under the governing legal framework, the critical issue is whether the President is acting 
with the approval of, inconsistently with, or in the absence of, congressional policy. See supra note 
97 and accompanying text.  
106 For an excellent empirical analysis of the Court’s review of administrative regulations, see 
generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court 
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008). 
107 See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 111-46 (2008) [hereinafter 
GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT].  
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rulings.108 They may decline, as President Abraham Lincoln famously suggested,109 
to comply with decisions they regard as seriously mistaken.  
The principal legal construct for assessing the constitutionality of 
presidential actions is, however, skewed against the presidency. That 
construct came from Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure 
case, which set forth a tripartite framework for determining the relative 
strength of the constitutional authority for presidential actions, depending on 
whether Presidents were acting (1) with congressional approval, which is their 
strongest constitutional ground; (2) in the absence of congressional action; or 
(3) contrary to congressional “will.”110 This framework (which could also serve 
as a baseline) gives Congress the opportunity to set the terms for constitutional 
analysis. Given that nonaction is the norm for Congress, the most common 
question likely to come before courts will be how to characterize the fact that 
Congress took no formal action on the matter before them. Nonaction could 
mean acquiescence, giving the President authority when Congress is silent, as the 
Supreme Court found in Dames & Moore v. Regan,111 or nonaction could imply 
disapproval, as a plurality of Justices found in Steel Seizure.112 The fact that 
Congress considered but did not approve President Obama’s immigration reform 
could be construed in more than one way.113  
B. Public Opinion and the Stewardship Conception of the Presidency 
Over the course of the last century, Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow 
Wilson’s stewardship conception of the presidency has become increasingly 
alluring to other occupants of the nation’s highest elected office.114 Under this 
view, Presidents can do anything as long as the Constitution does not 
expressly bar it. Presidents presumably have a “residuum” of power to act,115 
apart from whatever the Constitution says, and they have construed constitutional 
 
108 See Moe & Howell, supra note 18, at 151 (“[U]nder the Constitution, the Court is not 
empowered to enforce its own decisions, but must rely on the executive branch to enforce them.”). 
109 GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT supra note 107, at 170, 177. 
110 Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
111 453 U.S. 654, 675-89 (1981). 
112 343 U.S. at 589, 602 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 655 (Jackson, J., concurring); id. at 
660 (Burton, J., concurring); id. at 665-67 (Clark, J., concurring). 
113 President Obama’s legal arguments in support of his executive actions are that he is acting 
consistently with the laws enacted by Congress. See supra note 97-110 and accompanying text. As 
such, he is arguing that, within the tripartite framework set forth in Justice Jackson’s Steel Seizure 
concurrence, he is acting not in the twilight zone (where Congress is silent and the President can 
allege acquiescence) or in opposition to what Congress has directed (his weakest position), but rather 
in his constitutionally strongest position—in concert with congressional enactments.  
114 See Skowronek, The Conservative Insurgency, supra note 16, at 2087-92 (describing such a 
shift in attitude). 
115 See GERHARDT, THE FORGOTTEN PRESIDENTS, supra note 46, at 172. 
2016] Constitutional Arrogance 1671 
silence or ambiguity in favor of presidential power. Accordingly, public support 
is critical as driving or constraining the presidency.116 
Yet, relying on public opinion in this manner is problematic. As I have 
already noted, the public might not know or care about what Presidents do 
with regard to relatively low-profile matters, such as making lower court 
nominations or issuing signing statements. Moreover, public support is easy 
to manipulate. There is a serious question about how to measure public 
support—who counts, how reliable are the polls, and how strong and enduring 
must the public support be. For example, Theodore Roosevelt claimed he had 
the public’s support as President, even though at that time women did not have 
the right to vote and therefore had no formal say over who was President or who 
served in Congress.117 A supposed virtue of the modern administrative state is 
that it allows meaningful public input,118 even though public participation in the 
administrative process is likely small and largely self-selected (if not also 
operating or displaced through proxies). The information available to the 
public is imperfect, and most of the public is unlikely to know much or any 
details about administrative regulations.119  
Moreover, public support, which is instrumental to the stewardship 
conception of the presidency, requires placing the burden on the public to 
stop Presidents. If public support is to function as a meaningful check on 
presidential action, the public must, however, be made aware of what 
Presidents do before they take action. The difficulty is that this cannot always 
be done. Presidents cannot wait to get public approval each time before they 
do something. Waiting until public sentiment forms takes time, but that is 
different than claiming there was public support to begin with.  
C. The Judgment of History Redux 
I have previously noted that concern about how their legacy will be judged 
may give Presidents pause as they consider how far, or hard, to push or extend 
the boundaries of their powers. The concern has become more acute because 
 
116 One theory for Steel Seizure is that the lack of public support for American involvement in 
Korea and the seizure made it easier for the Court to strike down the President’s action. See generally 
Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, The Steel Seizure Case: One of a Kind?, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 63 (2002). 
117 The Nineteenth Amendment, granting women the right to vote, was ratified in 1920, almost 
a decade after President Roosevelt left office. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (declaring that the right 
to vote shall not be denied to citizens on the basis of sex). 
118 For an excellent overview of the different theories of how the administrative state facilitates 
democracy, see generally Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001). 
See also Note, Deweyan Democracy and the Administrative State, 125 HARV. L. REV. 580 (2011).  
119 See generally ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER 
GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER (2013) (arguing, inter alia, that the American public is generally 
ignorant about many specifics about policy and government). 
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of increasingly copious archival and public recordkeeping requirements.120 
While officials may try to fill records with self-serving justifications, these 
requirements impose transparency on administrators and establish enduring 
records for subsequent generations to judge.  
D. Constitutional Conventions 
Constitutional conventions are rules, habits, customs, or practices which 
regulate interaction among political actors but are unenforceable in court.121 
“The idea of constitutional construction seeks to identify how constitutional 
meaning and practices are developed in the interstices of the constitutional 
text, where discoverable meaning has run out.”122 Conventions are enforced 
primarily through public opinion.123  
A classic convention is the two-term presidency.124 A more pertinent 
example is the practice of Presidents explaining their actions.125 The Constitution 
 
120 See Presidential Records Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201–07 (2012) (defining the stringent process 
by which presidential and vice-presidential records, including electronic ones, must be maintained 
and released to the public and generally requiring disclosure at least five years after the end of an 
administration to pass before release); see also Presidential and Federal Records Act Amendments 
of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-187, 128 Stat. 2003-15 (expanding the reach of the Presidential Records Act, 
especially regarding electronic records); Exec. Order No. 13,556, 75 Fed. Reg. 68675 (Nov. 4, 2010) 
(prescribing a uniform system of classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying national security 
information); Exec. Order No. 13,489, 74 Fed. Reg. 4669 (Jan. 21, 2009) (revoking Executive Order 
13,233 and limiting the ability of executive officials and their families to invoke executive privilege 
to prevent public access to documents).  
121 A.V. Dicey delineates the classic formulation. See A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE 
STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 23-24 (10th ed. 1959) (“The other set of rules [in 
constitutional law, besides those set forth expressly in the Constitution, enacted by statute, or 
derived from common law,] consist of conventions, understandings, habits, or practices which, though 
they may regulate the conduct of the several members of the sovereign power . . . are not in reality 
laws at all since they are not enforced by the courts.”); id. at 422-23 (“[R]ules for determining the 
mode in which the discretionary powers of the Crown (or of the Ministers as servants of the Crown) 
ought to be exercised.”); see also GEOFFREY MARSHALL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS 17-18 
(1984) (positing that the distinction made by Dicey between law and conventions ought to be maintained). 
122 Keith E. Whittington, The Status of Unwritten Constitutional Conventions in the United States, 
2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1847, 1854 (2013); see also BRUFF, supra note 56, at 7 (“[A] feedback loop exists 
in which constitutional text, presidential behavior, and political response produce enduring 
precedents that operate as constitutional law.”); Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency 
Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1181 (2013) (recognizing the usefulness of conventions where 
formal legal rules fail to provide guidance). 
123 See Whittington, supra note 122, at 1852-53, 1860 (describing conventions as the general 
prevailing understandings of the Constitution of the day). 
124 The two-term presidency convention was followed until Franklin D. Roosevelt breached it. 
The convention was subsequently codified as constitutional law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXII. 
125 Another example of a convention is the tradition that all U.S. Attorneys tender their 
resignations at the beginning of every new administration. This convention allows incoming 
Presidents the opportunity, at least once, to select U.S. Attorneys based on their preferred criteria. 
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does not oblige Presidents to do so, but Presidents often feel they should and 
consult with legal advisors, including the Justice Department’s Office of Legal 
Counsel (OLC).126  
Conventions are, however, weak constraints on presidential discretion.127 
First, they are indeterminate. As Keith Whittington notes, “[T]here is no 
single authoritative repository of conventions or interpreter of them to 
resolve disagreements over their existence or meaning . . . . [They] are rarely 
reduced to writing and are instead implicit in tradition and practice.”128 They 
are not immune to change.129 
Second, public enforcement of conventions is uneven. For instance, 
Presidents’ public statements target different audiences and are framed 
differently than OLC opinions. The public is, however, unlikely to be as 
familiar with OLC opinions as they might be with presidential statements.130  
The conventions for OLC memoranda are as follows: they are binding 
authority within but only persuasive authority outside the executive branch; 
the White House should not pressure OLC for particular outcomes; and their 
analysis should be nonpartisan.131 How these conventions function is evinced 
by the fallout from the so-called torture memorandum, which addressed the 
legality of certain interrogation techniques of suspected terrorists.132 Once 
the memorandum became public, its subject matter was so politically salient 
 
Otherwise, the expectation is that U.S. Attorneys will not be replaced for political reasons. See 
generally GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS, supra note 42, at 385-86 n.41. 
126 On OLC’s authority and traditions, see Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of 
Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1448, 1511 (2010), which discusses the interaction between the 
President’s constitutional views and the OLC’s decision to overrule its own precedents.  
127 In contrast, Presidents’ lack of removal authority over the heads of independent agencies is 
a well-settled legal principle. See supra notes 72 and 73 and accompanying text. A direct challenge 
would likely trigger unfavorable judicial review.  
128 Whittington, supra note 122, at 1867. 
129 See also Bradley & Morrison, supra note 18, at 1132-37 (suggesting an important way in which 
law constrains executive branch officials is through internalizing legal norms). Similarly, Pozen 
argues that, beyond the bedrock of public opinion, other factors affecting the constraining force of 
conventions include (1) whether they have been internalized as morally appropriate or normatively 
binding by government actors and (2) whether relatively resilient equilibrium forces or game-theoretic 
dynamics contribute to conventions’ stability and efficacy. David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the 
Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 61-75 (2014).  
130 See generally What the Public Knows—in Pictures, Words, Maps and Graphs, PEW RESEARCH 
CENTER (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.people-press.org/2015/04/28/what-the-public-knows-in-pictures-
words-maps-and-graphs/ [https://perma.cc/D483-QPP3] (suggesting Americans tend to know some 
general things about American history and government but not many specifics). 
131 See generally Bradley & Morrison, supra note 18, at 1133. See also Neal Devins & Saikrishna 
B. Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 507, 546 (2012) (suggesting that 
OLC lawyers have an incentive to maintain OLC’s reputation, in part, “because their future career 
prospects are tied to it”).  
132 Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to 
the President (Aug. 1, 2002), https://hsdl.org/?view&did=741689 [https://perma.cc/CD9F-V8TN]. 
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that it grabbed the public’s attention, but “[t]he legal analysis . . . was so 
indefensible that it could not—and did not—withstand public scrutiny.”133  
OLC did not fare much better with its memorandum on President 
Obama’s recess appointments, which all nine Justices rejected in Noel 
Canning.134 That degree of rejection by the Court suggests OLC might have 
deviated from its convention of producing strong, nonpartisan reasoning in 
its analyses of constitutional questions. Moreover, the preimplementation 
release of OLC’s memorandum on President Obama’s amnesty relief program 
deviated from OLC’s convention of not releasing its reasoning “in advance 
of policy changes.”135 Such deviations suggest the possibility that political 
necessity rather than the law drove certain decisions. 
Finally, conventions vest the practices following them with the authority 
of appearing conventional. Conventions steer conduct into traditional paths. 
Lawyers do the same, in characterizing contested actions as common and 
analogous to conduct that has been upheld. Similarly, OLC memoranda 
purposefully cast presidential actions in terms designed to make them sound 
conventional. Thus, OLC memoranda are unreliable measures of the extent 
to which presidential actions are challenging or breaking boundaries. 
CONCLUSION 
The Framers originally expected the presidency to function principally as 
a check on legislative tyranny. In time, Presidents have developed the 
disposition and capacity to expand their powers at the expense of other 
branches. Over time, as case studies show, only a few meaningful checks keep 
the presidency within bound—judicial review, public opinion, concerns about 
being judged by future generations, and constitutional conventions. Yet, each 
of these can also push Presidents to challenge their limits and wrest power 
from other branches, perhaps most famously exemplified by Jefferson’s 
Louisiana Purchase, Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation,136 and Franklin 
Roosevelt’s internment of Japanese-Americans.137  
 
133 Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by OLC Torture Memorandum, 1 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & 
POL’Y 455, 462 (2005). 
134 See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text. 
135 Gabriel Malor, 4 Things You Should Know About DOJ’s Legal Justification for Obama’s Amnesty, 
THE FEDERALIST (Nov. 21, 2014), http://thefederalist.com/2014/11/21/4-things-you-should-know-
about-dojs-legal-justification-for-obamas-amnesty/ [https://perma.cc/APT2-UHL6]. 
136 See SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE, supra note 5, at 78-79, 214.  
137 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944) (upholding the constitutionality of 
President Franklin Roosevelt’s executive order detaining Japanese-Americans in internment 
camps); see also SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE, supra note 5, at 287-324 
(discussing President Franklin Roosevelt’s “reconstruction,” which “pressed hard against the 
boundaries of [his] political authority”).  
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Although these might be among the most dramatic instances of constitutional 
arrogance, the propensity and capacity for growth in presidential power is 
evident in other contexts. For instance, Presidents use their appointment and 
removal authorities to control executive agencies and they appoint trusted 
allies to lead independent agencies that are important to their agendas. They 
use other means, such as raising the stakes, to persuade agency heads, or use 
personal interactions to control policymaking. 
Public opinion matters most in presidential calculations on matters of great 
political salience, but that is only one factor that can influence Presidents. Once 
we move under the radar, do concerns about historical judgment, conventions, 
and judicial review exert more, or less, constraint on Presidents’ disposition and 
capacity for constitutional arrogance? We expect Presidents are strategic in 
choosing when, how hard, and how visibly they challenge their constitutional 
limits.138 While Presidents are unlikely to be able to wrest other branches’ 
discretion easily or often, they will likely keep trying to expand their own 




138 While the growth of presidential power during wartime has been documented, see generally 
JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 
(2012) (noting that wars and emergencies invariably shift power to the presidency, although other 
political actors counteract this shift), we still need comprehensive data on the constitutional effects 
of Presidents’ unilateral actions in other contexts. Future research should examine the extent to 
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